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NOTES
HOT CARGO CLAUSES AS DEFENSES TO VIOLATIONS OF
SECTION 8(b)(4)(A) OF THE LMRA*
IN addition to direct pressure, labor unions often use secondary boycotts to
influence employers with whom they have disputes.' The most significant form
of these boycotts is a concerted refusal to work by employees of employers
not engaged in a dispute, generally called secondary employers, to force them
to stop doing business with an employer involved in a dispute, generally called
a primary employer.2 Such refusals, which could usually be enjoined at com-
mon law,3 were insulated from injunction in the federal courts by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.4 But section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 1947 made it an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents
to induce employees of a secondary employer to engage in these work stop-
pages., The National Labor Relations Board has issued numerous cease and
desist orders against such union-induced boycotts," and these orders have been
*McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.LR.B. No. 224, 35 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1954).
1. FRANKRr. & GREENE, THE L.AOR IN uNcrON 43 (1930); 1 Y .Tn LAron
DisPrums AND CoizEcnw BARGAINMG § 141 (1940).
2. FRANxFURTER & GiRPmi4, op. cit. supra note 1, at 43. For examples of such boycotts
see cases cited note 6 infra. For a discussion of other types of secondary boycotts see
1 TELLRE, op. cit. mipra note 1, at § 141.
3. FRANKFURTR & GaVmNEr op. cit. supra note 1, at 43.
4. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952), Levering & Garrigues Co. v.
Mforrin, 71 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934).
Whether § 8(b) (4) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 pre-empts
the field of state supervision of secondary boycotts is a debated question. See Cox & Seid-
man, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HtRv. L. REv. 211, 236-38 (1950) (pre-emption) ;
Petro, Participation by the States in the Enforcenwit and Development of ANatioal Labor
Policy, 28 Noan D. mE LAw. 1, 66-69 (1952) (no pre-emption). If the field is not pre-
empted secondary boycotts will not be enjoined in some states because of local anti-injunc-
tion statutes patterned after the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 2 T~r.I.E, op. cit. supra note 1,
§§ 433-50.
5. 61 STAT. 141 (1947),29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (1952):
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring... any employer or other person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other persin
6. E.g., Los Angeles Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, AFL, 105 N.L.R.B. 8IS
(1953); Capital Serv., Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1952); Schenley Distillers Corp., 78
N.L.R.B. 504 (1948), enforcement granted sub non. NLRB v. Wine Workers Union,
AFL, 178 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1949).
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enforced by the courts.7 Since the 1949 case of Conway's Express," the
NLRB and the courts have recognized an exception to this rule where so-
called hot cargo clauses are included in the collective bargaining contract be-
tween the secondary employer and the union representing his employees.0
These clauses typically reserve to the employees the right to refuse to handle
"unfair goods"-those of any employer engaged in a labor dispute with any
union.' 0 The Conway doctrine regards hot cargo clauses as promises by
secondary employers to boycott hot goods." The conduct of union agents in
inducing workers not to handle unfair goods is considered to be merely caus-
ing "the employees to exercise their contractual privilege. 112 However, a
recent decision has cast doubt on the validity of the Conway doctrine.
In the case of McAllister Transfer, Inc.,13 the NLRB found a violation of
section 8(b)(4)(A) on facts similar to those in Conway. McAllister, who
was the primary employer and complaining party, had a labor dispute with a
union seeking to organize his workers.14 The employees of three trucking
companies with which McAllister did business stopped handling his goods
after agents of their union informed them of the dispute. The employees were
members of the Teamsters Union, which had hot cargo clauses in its agree-
ments with the secondary employers.', The trucking companies posted notices
7. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951);
Local 501, International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694
(1951) ; NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
8. Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), enforcement granted sub nont. Rabouili
v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
9. E.g., Madden v. Local 442, Teamsters Union, AFL, 114 F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Wig.
1953) ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953). But cf. Humphrey v. Local
294, Teamsters Union, AFL, 25 L.R.R.M. 2318 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (distinguishing Conway
because contract in that case was made before Taft-Hartley Act became effective; dlictum
that hot cargo clauses are contrary to policy of the act).
10. For examples of clauses using this terminology, see Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.1.
972, 1003, 1020 (1949) ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740, 741 (1953) ; note
15 infra.
11. Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972, 983 (1.949).
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953) where a hot cargo clause was
held to be a defense to an 8(b) (4) (A) complaint, the NLRB relied on Conway, and also
introduced a questionable new rationale: goods which would normally be handled by
employees are removed by a hot cargo clause from "the course of employment" and thus
from the scope of the act.
12. Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972, 983 (1949).
13. 110 N.L.R.B. No. 224,35 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1954).
14. The union seeking recognition was the Teamsters Union. Ibid.
15. The agreements read:
"ARTICLE IX. (a) It shall not be a violation of this contract and it shall not be
cause for discharge if any employee or employees refuse to go through the picket
line of a union or refuse to handle unfair goods. Nor shall the exercise of any rights
permitted by law be a violation of this contract.
"(b) The term 'unfair goods' as used in this Article includes, but is not limited
to, any goods or equipment transported, interchanged, handled, or used by any carrier,
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directing their men to handle all goods,16 but when these were ignored, the
secondary employers took no further action. Moreover, during the period of
the boycott, in accordance with an earlier agreement, the clauses were renego-
tiated to afford the union fuller protection.1'7 In a three to two decision, the
NLRB held the conduct of the union to be an unfair labor practice and issued
a cease and desist order.'8 Two majority Board members, Rodgers and Bee-
son, determined that in light of the other, contradictory facts, posting of orders
by the secondary employers did not amount to requests to work; nevertheless,
they found refusals by the employees, because goods which would ordinarily
be handled were ignored. And the members reasoned that the hot cargo term
could be no defense because 8(b) (4) (A) was adopted to protect primary
employers and the public, as well as secondary employers, from secondary
boycotts. Rodgers and Beeson argued that upholding hot cargo clauses would
allow the secondary employer to waive a right which was not his alone, and
they concluded that the Conway doctrine should be overruled. 10 Chairman
Farmer, concurring, viewed the notices posted by the secondary employers as
requests to work which their employees refused*2 0 He considered it irrelevant
that the orders were given in repudiation of the employers' agreements, reason-
ing that the statute makes no exception for such contracts. Farmer recognized
Conway as binding authority, but limited to the situation where the secondary
whether party to this agreement or not, at whose terminal or terminals or place or
places of business there is a controversy between such carrier or its employees on
the one hand, and a labor union on the other hand; and such goods or equipment
should continue to be 'unfair' while being transported, handled or used by inter-
changing or succeeding carriers, whether parties to this Agreement or not, until
such controversy is settle&"
McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B., No. 224, p. 9, 35 L.R.R.M. 1281, 1283 (1954).
16. All three companies posted the following notice:
"Our Company is not having a labor dispute with any labor union. As a common
carrier holding authorities under Federal and State laws, we are required to trans-
port all commodities properly tendered to us.
"Therefore, we direct all of our employees tu handle freight received by us, with-
out discrimination as to shippers or motor carriers who may be interlining freight
with us. This includes freight which we originate and is destined beyond our line
in which specific routing is furnished to us by the shipper."
McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B., No. 224, p. 7, 35 L.LR.M. 1281, 1283 (1954).
17. Pursuant to a record understanding that the clause would be renegotiated if the
Conway appeal were decided in favor of the union, the hot cargo clause, see note 15 mspra,
was changed by adding:
"The Union and its members, individually and collectively, reserve the right to
refuse to handle goods from or to any firm or truck which is engaged or involved
in any controversy with this or any other Union; and reserve the right to refuse to
accept freight from or to make pickups where freight lines, strikes, walk-outs or
lock-outs exist."
McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B., No. 224, p. 9, 35 L.R.R.M. 1281, 1283 (1954).
18. McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 224, 35 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1954).
19. Id. at 18, 35 L.R.R.M. at 1286.
20. Id. at 27-8,35 L.R.R.M. at 1289.
1955] 1203
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
employer voluntarily complies with his agreement and makes no demand for
work. Members Murdock and Peterson, in dissent, disagreed with the Chair-
man's view of the facts, finding that there was no repudiation of the hot cargo
agreements and no request to work.2 1 They indicated, moreover, that even
where the secondary employer does repudiate, they consider Conway as au-
thority for enforcing compliance with his contract. Regarding 8(b) (4) (A)
as designed only for the protection of the secondary employer, they would
hold him to his promise. In their view, the presence of a hot cargo agreement
is always a complete defense to an 8(b) (4) (A) charge.
The three opinions in McAllister may have far-reaching effects on secondary
boycotts, and they put in issue the future utility to unions of hot cargo clauses."2
Members Rodgers and Beeson, rejecting the Chairman's finding of a request
to work, at the same time found a refusal to work within the meaning of
8(b) (4) (A) .23 This they inferred from the existence of hot cargo clauses and
from the fact that no work was done on McAllister's goods after they arrived
at the secondary employers' terminals. This position would almost always
result in a finding of an 8(b) (4) (A) violation when any employer who is
a party to a hot cargo agreement is involved in a secondary boycott.24 Pre-
sumably the only boycotts which Rodgers and Beeson would allow are those
in which secondary employers take the initiative to prevent the handling of
goods from the primary employer. 25 Chairman Farmer's view is that for-
bidden secondary boycotts are those which are produced over the secondary
employer's objection by union-induced refusals to work." He regards boycotts
as legal when they can be achieved with employer consent, and would find
consent if the secondary employer takes no action to halt work stoppages to
which he has previously agreed. Farmer also points out that what the employer
can do he can agree to do.27 Should he then breach his agreement to boycott,
specific enforcement of the contract or self-help by the union would run against
21. Id. at 38-9,35 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
22. Subsequent to the McAllister decision, the Teamsters Union renegotiated hot cargo
clauses covering 200,000 truck drivers in 22 states. The new terms provide:
"The insistence on the part of an employer that his employees handle unfair
goods, or go through a picket line after they have elected not to do so, shall be
sufficient cause for an immediate strike of all such employer's operations without
any need to go through the grievance procedure herein."
35 LAB. REL REP. 259 (1955).
23. See text at note 19 suJpra.
24. Consequently, a union would be liable in damages under § 301, 61 STAT. 156 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952), to a primary employer when employees ceased handling unfair
goods and, pursuant to his agreement, their employer made no objection. See note 28 iufra.
25. A secondary employer who is a common carrier may be liable in damages to any
shipper whose goods he fails to ship. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Ter-
minal Co., 32 L.R.R.M. 2386 (D. Ore. 1953). But see Note, 39 CoaR. L.Q. 307, 313-14
(1954), suggesting that hot cargo agreements may relieve the carrier of his duty.
26. See text at note 20 supra.




the statutory prohibition, but the question remains what other penalty the
employer may be made to pay for his breach. If a hot cargo clause is a valid
contract term, the union should be able to sue for damages under section
301.28 This would lead to the anomaly of the secondary employer getting an
NLRB cease and desist order against the union, but at the same time being
made to answer in damages for his act. However, it is unlikely that damages
would be allowed. They would be an indirect way of achieving what may nut
be done directly;29 furthermore, the uncertain nature of damages 'Q might
render them unavailable.3 1 None of these problems exists for the dissenters who
regard a hot cargo clause as a valid contract provision which is a defense to
an 8(b) (4) (A) charge.32 However, a troublesome question resulting from
their position is the legality of a strike to obtain such a clause. Producing a
boycott by inducing a refusal to work is made legal by their view of the clause,
but such conduct is clearly illegal in the absence of a hot cargo term. Thus, a
strike to obtain such a contract provision would be banned by the general rule
which forbids strikes for unlawful objects33-a result inconsistent with the
asserted legality of the clause.34
28. 61 STAT. 156 (1947),29U.S.C.§ 185 (1952):
"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor urgani-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.'
Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. $27 (1950); Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers,
182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Note, 57 YALE L.J. 630 (1947).
In those states which allow damage actions for breach of collective bargaining agree-
ments, section 301 may have pre-empted the field. Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers,
Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Fitzgerald v. Dictograph Products, Inc., 28
L.R.R.M. 2611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
29. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953) ; 6 CoRBIN, Conmacrs § 1376
(1951).
30. No direct pecuniary damage to the union would result from the secondary em-
ployer's breach. The harm which is generally asserted to follow from loss of the weapon
of secondary pressure is deterioration of wage standards and weakening of the labor move-
ment. See S. REP. No. 105, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1947).
31. See 5 CoRBI , CO)NTRACTS § 1020 (1951) ; McCoamc, DA.MAGES § 26 (1935).
32. See text at note 21 supra.
33. See American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, 86 N.L.ILB. 951 (1949) ; Great At-
lantic & Pac. Tea Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1949); National Maritime Union, CIO, 78
N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforcement granted, 175 F.Zd 686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denicd, 338
U.S. 954 (1950). Moreover, a strike for a hot cargo clause might be forbidden by 8(b)-
(4) (A) itself. Comment, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 735, 741-42 (1954).
The question of the legality of a strike for a hot cargo term wvas specifically reserved
in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.ILB. 740, 744 n.6 (1952).
34. See 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952): "Employees shall have the
right... to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection . .. ." See also National Maritime Union, CIO v.
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Much of the disagreement among the members of the Board stems from the
difference between what Congress said about 8(b) (4) (A) and what 8(b)-
(4) (A) says. During the debates preceding enactment both proponents and
foes of the section asserted that its effect would be to ban all secondary boy-
cotts.35 Congress had decided that secondary boycotts were costly: to the
public in higher prices and the waste of perishables ;36 and to primary and
secondary employers in loss of profits, of investment, and of competitive posi-
tion. 7 The legislators concluded that in prohibiting all secondary boycotts
they would protect primary employers and the public as well as secondary
employers. The primary employer's interest is also recognized in sections
10(j) and 10(1)38 which allow him to obtain injunctive relief, and in section
303(a) which grants him a damage remedy."" On the other hand, 8(b) (4)-
(A) does not mention secondary boycotts explicitly; it says only that the
principal means of achieving them is illegal: union inducement of a concerted
refusal to work.40
Proper administration of section 8(b) (4) (A) requires that congressional
policy be implemented, but also that the distinction between goal and means
be observed. 41 In concentrating on Congress' intent, Members Rodgers and
Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 155 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 334 U.S. 854 (1948) (dictum that employees
have common law right to strike for any lawful purpose).
35. The late Sen. Taft said: "It is made an unfair labor practice for any union to
engage in a secondary -boycott." 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LAOR MANAGEaiENT
RELATIONs Acr, 1947, at 1012 (1948) (hereinafter cited as LEG. HisT.) ; S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947) (majority report) ; S. REP. No. 105, pt. 2, 80th Coug., 1st
Sess. 19-20 (1947) (minority report).
36. Remarks of Rep. Landis, 1 LEG. HIsT. 583; remarks of Rep. Hartley, 1 id. at 614.
37. E.g., remarks of Sen. Ellender, 2 LEG. HisT. 1056; remarks of Sen. Taft, 2 id. at
1107; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947).
38. 61 STAT. 146-50 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1) ; Douds v. Local 294, Teamsters
Union, AFL, 75 F. Supp. 414 (N.D.N.Y. 1947) (not distinguishing between 10(j) and
10(l) ). If there is reasonable cause to believe that irreparable injury will result to a boy-
cotted employer, § 10(j) allows the Board to petition for temporary relief after issuance
of a complaint, and § 10(l) directs enforcement officers to seek injunctive relief before a
complaint has been issued.
39. 61 STAT. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (1952); United Brick Workers, AFL
v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952) ; Beth-
lehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, CIO, 115 F. Supp. 231 (E.D.N.Y.
1953); see International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237
(1952).
40. A possible explanation of Congress' failure to use the term secondary boycott is
suggested by the colloquy between Sen. Taft and Sen. Pepper reported in 2 LEG. HisT.
1105-09 (1948) (difficulty of precise description and categorization of secondary boycotts).
41. In Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1952), Judge Clark said:
"But in a matter of such bitter controversy as the Taft-Hartley Act, the product
of careful legislative drafting and compromise beyond which its *protagonists either




Beeson override the language of the statute to conclude that almost all second-
ary boycotts are prohibited. On the other hand, Congress' desire to protect
primary employers is too plain to render tenable the dissenters' theory that the
secondary employer's agreement to a hot cargo clause is alone sufficient to
make the union's conduct lawful. Chairman Farmer's interpretation of 8(b)-
(4) (A) adheres closely to the language of the statute and at the same time
would seem to serve congressional policy effectively.
